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THE JOHN WESLEY POWED, STIIDENT RESEARCH CONFERENCE - APRIL 2003 
Poster Presentation P6 
THE EFFECTS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSAATION STRUCTURE 
ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
Km:y Blumer and Michael Seeborg* 
Department of Economics, Illinois Wesleyan University 
Corporate executives are paid at extremely high levels compared to lower-level 
employees, especially in the United States, and their level of compensation usually does 
not change based on company performance with respect to competitors, but rather with 
changes in their company's stock price. It is well known that executive compensation 
among U.S. corporations is comprised mostly of stock options, sometimes up to 90% of 
overall compensation (EDGAR 2003). These stock options allow executives, namely 
chief executive officers (CEOs), to cash in big bucks during good times and risk zero 
losses during bad times. I use principal-agent theory and past literature to hypothesize 
the pattern of changes in shareholder wealth, and in reported earnings, from 1993-2001 
for 20 U.S. "blue chip" companies. Using simple linear regression analysis, I find that 
differences in CEO compensation structure have no significant effects on shareholder 
wealth and reported earnings. I also find that companies whose CEOs sell an unusually 
high value of stock options suffer a significant decline in shareholder value in the 
following year. Policy implications, based on my findings and other literature, are also 
discussed. 
